OPINION | Naval Diplomacy Emerges as an Anchor in India–Bangladesh Ties During a Diplomatic Downturn

by Ashu Mann

The past 18 months under the Yunus regime have been marked by considerable strain in India-Bangladesh relations. During this period, political engagement slowed across multiple fronts. High-level meetings were postponed, routine dialogues lost momentum, and bilateral agreements encountered hesitation. The cancellation of Bangladesh’s defense procurement deal with an Indian shipbuilder in May 2025 underscored this trend. Exercise SAMPRITI, the flagship military engagement between the two armies, has remained suspended since its last edition in 2023. Yet naval cooperation continued largely as planned.

India’s naval training engagement with Bangladesh under the ITEC program has created a layer of professional continuity that politics has struggled to disrupt. Since 2016, hundreds of Bangladeshi naval officers have trained at Indian institutions, acquiring practical skills in navigation, engineering, communications, hydrography, and maritime enforcement alongside their Indian counterparts. These courses build familiarity and professional habits rather than attract headlines.

The numbers illustrate the depth of this engagement. In 2023–24, India allocated 39 training slots to Bangladesh, of which 37 were utilized. The following year, 2024–25, the number rose to 42 slots, with 34 Bangladeshi officers attending courses in India despite prevailing political sensitivities. Overall, from 2016–17 to 2024–25, a total of 491 Bangladeshi personnel received training in India under the ITEC program, reflecting nearly a decade of steady and structured maritime cooperation.

That continuity held even during the most sensitive months. In 2024–25, when political ties were at their weakest, Bangladeshi officers continued attending courses in India. Training schedules were maintained quietly, without public emphasis.

In 2025, the two navies proceeded with the fifth edition of Exercise Bongosagar and the sixth Coordinated Patrol, or CORPAT, in the Bay of Bengal. Ships operated in designated sectors, drills were conducted, and patrols were coordinated without public fanfare. This occurred at a time when political messaging in Dhaka remained cautious and bilateral diplomacy was operating at a low ebb. Bangladesh deferred major defense commitments, including the cancellation of a shipbuilding contract with an Indian firm in May 2025. The army exercise SAMPRITI has remained on hold since 2023. Yet the maritime dimension of the relationship stayed active.

This pattern extends beyond Bangladesh. Across the Indian Ocean, India’s naval relationships are built less around equipment transfers and more around people. Officers from Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Mauritius continue to train in Indian institutions, forming professional networks that often outlast political shifts at home.

This approach aligns with New Delhi’s broader SAGAR framework, but its real strength lies in its simplicity. Training does not bind partners to political positions; it fosters trust. When circumstances change, that trust endures. Capacity building has long been a hallmark of the Indian Navy’s approach to naval diplomacy. Over time, it has produced tangible results. Relationships forged in classrooms and at sea have turned cooperation into routine practice, creating a network of maritime partners connected less by contracts and more by confidence.

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About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.