Transmission Line Losses: Fixing Symptoms, Not Causes

Pakistan’s power crisis is once again being framed as a technical problem. Transmission losses, officials argue, can be reduced through better lines, upgraded equipment, and new projects supported by Chinese expertise. On paper, this sounds sensible. In reality, it sidesteps the root causes of the crisis and repeats a familiar pattern: fixing surface-level issues while ignoring deeper structural failures. Nowhere is this approach more visible, or more risky, than in the energy plans linked to Gwadar.

Transmission losses are real. Pakistan loses a significant share of the electricity it generates before it reaches consumers. Aging lines, overloaded transformers, and poor maintenance all contribute. But these technical weaknesses are only part of the story. The deeper problems lie in governance failures, widespread power theft, and a financial system crippled by circular debt. Without addressing these issues, no amount of new hardware will deliver lasting change.

Chinese recommendations tend to focus on what they know best: engineering solutions. New high-voltage lines, modern substations, and digital monitoring systems are presented as answers. While such upgrades may reduce losses at the margins, they leave the core dysfunction untouched. Electricity that is stolen, bills that go uncollected, and payments that are delayed cannot be fixed with steel towers and smart meters alone.

Power theft remains rampant across large parts of Pakistan. Entire neighborhoods draw electricity illegally, often with political protection. Distribution companies lack both the authority and the will to enforce the law. Every stolen unit becomes a cost shifted onto paying consumers or the state. Upgrading transmission lines does nothing to stop this leakage. In fact, better lines can end up delivering more power into a system that still cannot control losses or recover costs.

Circular debt compounds the damage. Because distribution companies fail to collect sufficient revenue, they cannot pay generators and fuel suppliers on time. The government intervenes with subsidies and borrowing, pushing debt even higher. Interest costs rise, and funds meant for maintenance and reform are diverted to plugging short-term gaps. In this environment, even well-designed infrastructure quickly deteriorates.

Gwadar exposes how dangerous this mindset has become. Energy projects linked to the port are treated as strategic priorities and insulated from scrutiny. Transmission upgrades and new lines are justified as essential for Gwadar’s future, even though actual demand remains limited. The assumption is that power must be built first and problems will resolve themselves later. This is precisely how Pakistan ended up with excess generation capacity and ballooning debt.

Chinese involvement reinforces this approach. Beijing’s focus is on tangible deliverables, lines built, equipment installed, projects completed. Institutional reform, loss recovery, and governance are not central to the model. For Pakistan’s leadership, this is convenient. It allows progress to be announced without confronting politically sensitive issues such as theft, corruption, and reform of loss-making utilities.

The result is a growing mismatch. Pakistan borrows to upgrade transmission infrastructure while the distribution system continues to bleed money. Losses shift location but do not disappear. Debt rises. Consumers face higher tariffs. Demand weakens further. The cycle tightens.

There is also a strategic cost. Infrastructure tied to Gwadar is not neutral. Transmission lines feeding port-linked projects become part of broader geopolitical arrangements. Pakistan assumes the financial and security risks, while external partners gain assured access and influence. When these projects fail to perform economically, Pakistan is left servicing the loans.

Technical fixes are attractive because they are clean and measurable: kilometers of line upgraded, megawatts transmitted, losses reduced on paper. But the lived reality remains unchanged. Power theft continues. Bills remain unpaid. Circular debt grows.

A serious solution would start elsewhere. It would begin with governance reform in distribution companies, strict enforcement against theft, realistic tariffs, and transparent accounting. It would slow new projects until existing capacity is properly utilized. And it would treat Gwadar as a gradual, demand-led development, not a justification for rushing debt-financed infrastructure.

Pakistan does not lack engineers or equipment. It lacks political will. Until that changes, transmission upgrades will remain cosmetic fixes applied to a broken system.

Gwadar, instead of becoming a symbol of renewal, risks turning into another showcase of misplaced priorities. New lines will carry power that is never paid for. New loans will deepen old debts. And the country will once again be told that the solution lies in the next project, rather than in fixing what is already failing.

Transmission losses are a symptom, not the disease. Treating them in isolation may impress partners and lenders, but it will not save Pakistan’s power sector. Without confronting theft, corruption, and financial mismanagement, every new line built merely extends the problem, toward Gwadar and beyond.