OPINION | Mumbai, Kabul, and Beyond: Chronicling ISI-Supported Terrorist Attacks

By Major General RPS Bhadauria (Retd)

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has emerged as one of the most destabilising forces in South Asian security, operating a sophisticated network of terrorist proxies that has orchestrated some of the region’s deadliest attacks. From the streets of Mumbai to the mountains of Afghanistan, the ISI’s fingerprints are evident across a trail of violence that has claimed thousands of innocent lives and undermined regional stability for decades.

The Mumbai Massacre: A State-Sponsored Spectacle

The November 2008 Mumbai attacks stand as perhaps the most damning evidence of ISI’s direct involvement in international terrorism. The sophisticated, multi-target assault that claimed 175 lives was not merely the work of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, it was a meticulously planned operation orchestrated and monitored by Pakistan’s intelligence establishment.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks were sponsored by Pakistan’s ISI through significant financial and material support. David Headley, a key planner of the operation, received $28,500 from Major Iqbal, a serving ISI officer, to fund reconnaissance trips to Mumbai. Additionally, Zabiuddin Ansari, an involved operative, confirmed that the ISI supplied the weapons and ammunition used by the attackers, ensuring the group was well-equipped to carry out the assault. The ISI also directed the attacks by providing training and real-time oversight. Headley was trained by the ISI in intelligence collection techniques, while the gunmen received training from former Pakistani special forces members, enhancing their operational capabilities. Finally, the ISI perpetrated the attacks through direct involvement and subsequent efforts to conceal its role. Serving ISI operatives actively participated in directing the gunmen from the control room, as evidenced by intercepted communications. Following the attacks, the Pakistani state, influenced by the ISI, obstructed the investigation by delaying proceedings, issuing threats, and even assassinating a prosecutor, while key plotters like Sajid Majeed evaded arrest on ISI advice, further indicating the agency’s deep involvement.

The evidence of ISI involvement extends far beyond individual testimonies. Zabiuddin Ansari, another key operative captured in the Mumbai plot, confirmed that ISI officers were present in the Pakistani command post from where the attacks were directed. Communication intercepts recorded Ansari talking to the gunmen whilst working alongside Lashkar chiefs who coordinated the massacre by telephone.

Financial trails further expose the ISI’s role in bankrolling the operation. The European Foundation for South Asian Studies estimates that ISI’s yearly expenditure towards terrorist organisations runs between $125-250 million, covering “salaries, cash incentives for high-risk operations and retainers for guides, porters and informers”.

Afghan Killing Fields: ISI’s Proxy War

In Afghanistan, the ISI’s terrorist operations have been conducted through a sophisticated network of proxy groups, most notably the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. These groups have served as instruments of Pakistani foreign policy, launching devastating attacks across Afghanistan whilst maintaining plausible deniability for Islamabad.

The ISI’s relationship with the Taliban goes back to the movement’s inception in the 1990s. By 2001, Pakistan was providing the Taliban regime with hundreds of advisers, thousands of fighters, and the oil needed to run their war machine. According to Taliban commanders interviewed by researcher Matt Waldman, the ISI “orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the movement,” providing “huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies”.

The Haqqani Network, designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, has served as what former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mike Mullen described as a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s ISI”. This group has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks during the Afghan conflict, including the 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul that led to deaths of 25 people.

Taliban commanders have confirmed that ISI agents attended Taliban leadership meetings and provide specific targeting instructions. As one commander described, “The ISI make plots for killing commanders who do not obey their orders… They have their groups and commanders, to whom they pay a lot, very secretly”.

The scale of this support is staggering. From 2003-2004, the ISI operated training camps for Taliban recruits and facilitated the supply of funds, equipment and arms from Gulf countries. The Pakistani army established medical facilities for Taliban fighters and provided covering fire at border crossings. A joint US, NATO and Afghan intelligence assessment in 2006 concluded that the ISI not only provided sanctuary for the Taliban but also “paid and pressured them to fight”.

The Haqqani Terror Machine

The Haqqani Network represents the most lethal component of ISI’s terrorist infrastructure. Based in North Waziristan, Pakistan, this group has conducted some of Afghanistan’s most sophisticated and deadly attacks under direct ISI guidance.

The network’s operations demonstrate professional-level planning and execution that only state sponsorship could provide. The 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul, was coordinated through direct telephone contact between ISI officials and militants. US intelligence agencies intercepted these communications, providing conclusive evidence of ISI involvement in the attack’s planning and execution.

The Strategic Doctrine Behind ISI Terrorism

The ISI’s support for terrorism represents a deliberate strategic doctrine designed to achieve Pakistan’s geopolitical objectives through asymmetric warfare. This approach, initiated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, has evolved into a comprehensive system of proxy warfare that serves multiple strategic objectives.

The intelligence agency’s operations are designed to maintain pressure on regional adversaries whilst creating strategic depth for Pakistan. The ISI’s annual budget for these operations, estimated at over $250 million, demonstrates the Pakistani state’s commitment to terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy.

The recruitment infrastructure supporting these operations spans multiple countries and includes madrassas, charitable organisations, and religious networks that provide continuous recruitment capabilities This systematic approach to radicalisation creates a renewable pipeline of operatives willing to conduct high-risk operations on behalf of the Pakistani state

 Last Word

The ISI’s terrorist network continues to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances. The agency maintains operational presence across multiple continents, with cells reported in Europe, Australia, and other Western nations. This global reach enables the ISI to project power far beyond its immediate regional environment.

The agency’s support for groups like ISIS-K and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan demonstrates its willingness to work with diverse terrorist organisations to achieve strategic objectives13. This flexibility has enabled the ISI to maintain operational effectiveness even as individual proxy groups face pressure from international counterterrorism efforts.

The evidence presented here represents only a fraction of the documented cases linking the ISI to terrorist operations across the region. From systematic training of militants to coordination of complex international attacks, the ISI has established itself as one of the world’s most dangerous state sponsors of terrorism, demanding urgent international attention to counter this institutionalised machinery of terror.

About Author

Maj Gen. RPS Bhadauria (Retd) is the Additional Director General of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, and was formerly the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies & Simulation (CS3) at USI of India, having served in the Indian Army for 36 years.