OPINION | Contours of Confrontation (Part-II): The India–China Rivalry and Its Global Implications

Part II: The Doctrine of Deception: From Aksai Chin to Galwan

By Ashu Mann

China’s pattern of coercion has displayed remarkable continuity since 1962. The same doctrinal elements that shaped the invasion of India, strategic ambiguity, calibrated violence, and manipulation of diplomacy, have guided the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from Aksai Chin to Galwan. India’s reaction, however, has transformed from unprepared optimism to disciplined deterrence. The confrontation now symbolizes a clash between two military philosophies: one that treats deception as a strategy, and another that treats professionalism as power.

A doctrine born of 1962

In 1962, Beijing discovered that surprise and timing could yield victory even against a numerically inferior foe. The PLA’s concept of “active defense,” offensive operations justified as pre-emptive self-protection, emerged from that campaign. China reframed aggression as caution, occupation as stability, and deception as diplomacy.

The lessons of that war became institutional memory. Every decade since, Beijing has applied the same principles: consolidate control under the guise of dialogue, rewrite facts on the ground, and accuse the other side of provocation. Whether along the Himalayan ridges, in the Paracel Islands, or around Taiwan, the rhythm has been identical.

The mechanics of controlled escalation

Modern PLA strategy merges military and political warfare. Its “Three Warfares” doctrine, psychological, media, and legal, seeks to shape perception before shots are fired. The objective is not destruction but disorientation: to make opponents doubt their rights and allies question their commitments.

In border management, this translates into calibrated coercion. Patrols push forward under diplomatic cover; construction activity legitimizes presence; sudden withdrawals simulate goodwill. The intent is to change the status quo one ridge at a time while maintaining plausible deniability.

This system rewards initiative and ambiguity, not restraint. It is a doctrine designed for expansion without open war, a trait that Europe has also confronted in its eastern neighborhood.

From Doklam to Galwan: the same playbook

The 2017 Doklam standoff offered an early rehearsal. Chinese forces attempted to extend a road into Bhutanese territory near the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction. When India intervened to uphold Bhutan’s claim, Beijing launched a propaganda offensive accusing New Delhi of intrusion. After 73 days of tension, the PLA disengaged, but satellite imagery later showed new fortifications nearby. Withdrawal had become re-entry by another route.

Three years later, the pattern repeated on a larger scale. In Galwan Valley (June 2020), Chinese troops attacked Indian soldiers during an agreed disengagement process, wielding improvised melee weapons in violation of every confidence-building agreement. The PLA’s objective was not territorial conquest but psychological leverage: to test India’s political resolve amid the global distraction of COVID-19.

The comparison with 1962 is striking. Then, Beijing exploited the Cuban Missile Crisis; now, a pandemic. Then, it used diplomacy to mask mobilization; now, to manage outrage. Then, it retreated after achieving limited gains; now, it freezes tactical advantages behind “buffer zones.”

The doctrine has matured, but its essence remains deception as method.

Professional restraint as strategic power

The Indian Army’s reaction to Galwan revealed a different ethos. Despite lethal provocation, Indian soldiers refrained from using firearms in accordance with existing protocols, displaying control under chaos. Twenty Indian soldiers, including Colonel B. Santosh Babu, fell in combat, but they inflicted heavy casualties and held their ground. The contrast with the PLA’s opacity, its refusal to disclose losses, was telling.

In subsequent months, India undertook rapid force augmentation, logistical reinforcement, and parallel diplomacy. Forward infrastructure, air-mobility corridors, and all-weather roads were accelerated. The posture shifted from reactive restraint to deterrence through presence.

Where the PLA seeks advantage through secrecy, India builds credibility through transparency and professionalism, a distinction that resonates with European civil-military traditions.

The institutionalization of coercion

Under President Xi Jinping, the PLA has become an instrument of party control rather than national accountability. Its loyalty is political, not constitutional. This blurs the line between deterrence and provocation: any local commander can act aggressively, confident that ambiguity will protect him.

China’s 2022 “Border Law,” asserting unilateral administrative authority over “claimed territories,” codified expansionism. Infrastructure projects, bridges over Pangong Tso, underground bunkers, dual-use airports, signal permanent militarization. The aim is to transform geography into irreversible sovereignty, much as artificial islands did in the South China Sea.

Such behavior reveals a structural difference. For the PLA, coercion is a normal instrument of policy; for the Indian Army, it is a last resort. The two forces operate under opposing civil-military ethics.

Why the pattern matters to Europe

Europe’s strategic community increasingly recognizes that China’s Himalayan methods mirror its global behavior. The gray-zone tactics used against India, incremental assertion under legal ambiguity, resemble coercive energy diplomacy, cyber intrusion, and influence operations seen in Europe.

The lesson from Galwan is therefore not regional. It illustrates how an authoritarian state tests norms by targeting the edges of international attention. Just as the Cuban Missile Crisis diverted focus in 1962, today’s crises, Ukraine, Gaza, economic turbulence, create openings for Beijing to act elsewhere. The Himalayas are both a frontier and a forecast.

India’s deterrence architecture

Since 2020, India has reinforced its northern command structure, expanded mountain strike capabilities, and introduced integrated surveillance systems linking satellites, drones, and ground sensors. Projects such as the Atal Tunnel, Sela Pass tunnel, and the Darbuk–Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldi road ensure year-round logistics at high altitude. These are not provocations; they are prerequisites for stability.

Doctrinally, India now operates under the principle of deterrence by denial, making aggression too costly and too uncertain to attempt. Combined with diplomatic firmness, refusing to normalize ties until peace on the Line of Actual Control is restored, this posture has altered Beijing’s calculus.

For the first time in decades, the PLA faces an opponent equally capable of sustaining long deployments and controlling escalation.

Professionalism versus coercion

At its core, the confrontation is a contest between worldviews. The PLA’s coercive doctrine sees conflict as perpetual and deception as legitimate. The Indian Army’s professional doctrine views stability as service to the nation and restraint as a form of strength.

This difference has strategic consequences. India’s transparency, rule-based conduct, and democratic accountability lend credibility to its partnerships, from the Quad to cooperation with France in the Indo-Pacific. China’s opacity, by contrast, alienates potential partners and reinforces perceptions of threat.

For Europe, the implication is clear: the values that shape a military’s internal discipline ultimately determine its external behavior.

Continuity of coercion, evolution of deterrence

From Aksai Chin in 1962 to Galwan in 2020, the script has remained the same: strike under cover of dialogue, blame the victim, and withdraw before escalation. What has changed is India’s ability to read the script in advance.

The Indian Army of today is not the force of 1962. It is modern, networked, and psychologically conditioned for sustained mountain warfare. Its ethos of restraint contrasts sharply with the PLA’s compulsion for control.

For Europe, the broader message is one of vigilance. The behavior China rehearses on the Himalayan frontier informs its global conduct. Recognizing the lineage from past deception to present coercion is essential for preserving the balance of power in both Asia and the wider world.

The final part of this series will examine how India’s deterrent posture and its partnerships, including with European powers, are reshaping the security architecture that China’s 1962 betrayal first set in motion.

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About Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.