Aksai Chin and the Unfinished War: Why the 1962 Faultline Still Shapes India-China Relations

by Ashu Maan

The Geography and Origins of the Dispute

Aksai Chin is a remote and inhospitable region located in the northern part of Ladakh, bordered by Tibet (now under Chinese control) to the east and the Siachen Glacier to the west. The region is characterized by its harsh, mountainous terrain and extreme weather conditions, making it sparsely populated and difficult to govern. The area is largely barren, with very few human settlements, but its strategic significance has been magnified due to its position at the crossroads of India, China, and Pakistan.

While the region itself might not seem crucial in terms of resources or population, Aksai Chin has immense strategic importance due to its proximity to key military and trade routes between China’s Xinjiang province and Tibet. This location becomes particularly significant when viewed in the context of India’s security concerns, especially its border with China and the ongoing India-China rivalry.

The dispute originated from differing colonial-era boundary proposals. India recognizes the 1865 Johnson Line, which places Aksai Chin within its territory, while China favors the 1899 Macartney-MacDonald Line, which assigns it to China. The British never resolved the matter, leaving it as an unadministered plateau.

Similar is the case with the McMahon Line. It was a boundary drawn in 1914 between British India and Tibet, forming the boundary between India and China in the Himalayas, though China refuses to recognize it. The former was a proposal in a disputed area, whereas the latter defines an actual, albeit disputed, boundary.

The unresolved boundary disputes rooted in the colonial-era Macartney-Macdonald Line (western sector) and McMahon Line (eastern sector) were the primary causes of the 1962 Indo-China War. India and China had fundamentally different claims and perceptions of these proposed borders, leading to escalating tensions.

The 1962 War and Its Aftermath

In the years following India’s independence, China gradually established control over Aksai Chin. Without India's knowledge, China constructed the G219 highway through the region to connect its restive Xinjiang and Tibet provinces, solidifying its hold. India only discovered the highway in 1957 via Chinese maps. Aksai Chin became a major point of contention in the 1962 war. Indian forces were defeated, and China cemented its control over approximately 38,000 sq km of the region. Though China eventually withdrew from areas it occupied in the eastern sector, it retained control of Aksai Chin.

Following the 1962 conflict, China established its control over Aksai Chin, building roads and infrastructure in the region to solidify its presence. Despite its occupation, China has continued to claim that the region is part of its Xinjiang province, while India has consistently argued that Aksai Chin is an integral part of its Ladakh region, which is administered as part of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (now also part of the newly formed Union Territory of Ladakh after 2019).

Interestingly, Pakistan’s involvement in the Aksai Chin dispute adds a layer of complexity. While Pakistan is not directly involved in the territorial dispute over Aksai Chin, it plays an indirect role due to its close relationship with China and its own territorial dispute with India over Kashmir. After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China and Pakistan strengthened their strategic ties, particularly in the context of their shared interests in countering India’s influence in the region.

The Line of Actual Control and Renewed Tensions

Despite the passage of decades, the Aksai Chin issue remains unresolved. While the 1962 Sino-Indian War ended in a ceasefire and the establishment of a “Line of Actual Control” (LAC) between the two countries, this demarcation hasn’t been accepted by India. The LAC is largely a de facto border that separates the areas controlled by both countries, but it is not a legally binding boundary, and skirmishes between the two nations continue to occur sporadically along this line.

India maintains its claim over Aksai Chin, considering it part of its Union Territory of Ladakh, which has been illegally occupied by China. Official Indian government maps depict Aksai Chin as part of India. As of today, China continues to increase its administrative and military presence in the region. In late 2024 and early 2025, China created new administrative counties in the Hotan prefecture, which includes territory in Aksai Chin. India formally protested this action, stating it would not legitimize China's occupation.

A persistent military standoff has continued along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020. Both sides have reinforced their military strength, with China building substantial infrastructure near the contested border.

China is significantly increasing its military infrastructure in the Aksai Chin region, including constructing extensive underground bunkers and civilian-military dual-purpose villages to support troops and sustain operations in the long term. India is responding with its own infrastructure upgrades, such as improving air bases in the Ladakh sector to boost troop deployment and enhance its presence.

Strategic Implications and the Ongoing Standoff

Aksai Chin’s significance in geopolitics extends far beyond its mere geographic location. From a strategic standpoint, control over Aksai Chin allows China to secure its western borders, linking its restive Xinjiang province with Tibet. The region also serves as a vital communication and transportation route, with China having built the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway through the area. This highway is of immense importance for China, as it facilitates the movement of military and economic resources between Tibet and Xinjiang, regions that are both crucial to China’s internal stability and its economic ambitions in Central Asia.

For India, however, the loss of Aksai Chin represents more than just a territorial setback—it affects national security, as the region forms a strategic buffer along the border with China. The occupation of Aksai Chin by China reduces India’s strategic options in the event of military conflict. Moreover, the region’s proximity to key military bases, such as those located in Leh, further exacerbates the concerns of India’s defense establishment.

The force build-up and construction of support infrastructure indicate that both sides are ready to sustain long-term deployments. The growing scale and expansive scope of both India’s and China’s military presence indicate a preference to project capability for rapid engagement in offensive operations if one country’s presence is contested by the other side.

Both intend to maintain forward deployments and want the other side to recognize that and make concessions first in the ongoing military and diplomatic talks. China had a first-mover advantage in the early stages of discussions. Now, India has also built up considerable infrastructure, enhanced the number of troops deployed along the border, and bolstered support facilities.

Both sides are attempting to exploit gaps in the other’s posture and seek asymmetric advantage, which can increase the risk of an armed confrontation. With the global geopolitical situation fast changing due to the tariff war declared by the US, forcing a seemingly thaw in Indo-China relationship after the Galwan skirmish, it remains to be seen whether it will ease the tense situation along the LAC.

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About Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.