OPINION | Pakistan’s ‘Carrier-Killer’ Claims Ring Hollow as Navy Stays Close to Shore

by Cmde Ranjit Rai

In recent years, Pakistan has tried to project a strong image of its naval power, especially through dramatic missile tests and official statements suggesting new long-range strike capabilities. Social media, patriotic channels, and speculative defense blogs have helped amplify this story, painting Pakistan as a rising force at sea. But when the actual operational record of the Pakistan Navy is examined, a very different picture emerges—one defined by limited deployments, maintenance problems, and restricted situational awareness.

The hard reality is simple: a navy that struggles to leave harbor during a crisis cannot realistically threaten an Indian carrier group operating hundreds of kilometers away. The gap between Pakistan’s narrative and its operational capacity has never been more visible than during India’s Operation Sindoor.

A Fleet That Stayed Close to Shore

During moments of military tension, navies typically increase their presence at sea. Warships disperse, submarines spread out, and fleets position themselves to monitor enemy movements or contest sea lanes. But during India’s Operation Sindoor in 2025, Pakistan did not do this. Instead, most of its surface fleet reportedly remained close to Karachi, with only limited activity beyond coastal waters.

Observers noted that Pakistan’s frigates and missile boats avoided wide patrol patterns. There were no signs of forward deployments, aggressive maneuvers, or attempts to shadow Indian ships. At a time when India’s Western Fleet was operating confidently across the Arabian Sea, Pakistan’s vessels stayed confined to a narrow zone near their home ports.

This behavior was not consistent with a navy preparing to counter Indian operations. It was consistent with a navy trying to preserve its assets by avoiding escalation or risk.

Maintenance and Propulsion Constraints

One reason for Pakistan’s restricted movements appears to be the state of its naval fleet. Several of Pakistan’s warships have faced maintenance delays, propulsion problems, or spare-part shortages in recent years. When such issues accumulate, a navy becomes cautious about sending ships far from shore, where repairs or emergencies are much harder to manage.

Some vessels reportedly remained docked because they were undergoing refits or lacked fully functional engines. Others operated at reduced availability, meaning they could sail only within limited distances or for short durations. For a navy working with a restricted budget and heavy dependence on foreign components, such constraints are serious.

This limited readiness contrasts sharply with the image Pakistan tries to project. If a navy cannot reliably send out ships during a period of heightened tension, it cannot convincingly claim the ability to operate advanced missile systems in contested blue waters.

India’s Sea Control During Operation Sindoor

While Pakistan’s fleet stayed close to the coastline, India’s Navy took the opposite approach. Indian warships dispersed across the Arabian Sea, maintaining a broad presence and demonstrating confidence in their ability to maneuver freely.

Carrier-borne aircraft, destroyers, and frigates operated with high readiness levels. India maintained the initiative throughout the standoff. Indian maritime patrol aircraft also flew openly in the region, mapping surface movements and closely monitoring the Pakistani coastline.

At no point did Pakistan challenge this presence. Its ships remained passive observers, protected by proximity to coastal defenses but unable to influence conditions at sea.

Pakistan’s inability to challenge Indian movement during Operation Sindoor reveals the gap between a coastal fleet and a true blue-water navy. It also weakens Pakistan’s claim of having achieved long-range anti-ship strike capability.

A Weak Maritime Awareness Picture

Another major limitation is Pakistan’s maritime domain awareness—its ability to detect, track, and understand activity at sea. Effective ASBM operations require a wide view of the ocean, including the location and movement of multiple enemy ships. But Pakistan does not yet have this capability.

Its radar coverage remains coastal. It relies heavily on shore-based sensors with limited range. It does not operate a fleet of long-endurance maritime drones or multiple modern reconnaissance aircraft. And for satellite coverage, Pakistan depends on foreign partners.

This means Pakistan cannot maintain a continuous, independent picture of ship movements hundreds of kilometers out at sea. Without this basic information, even the most advanced missile cannot reliably strike a moving naval formation.

A carrier group is not a static dot on a radar screen—it constantly changes position, speed, and direction. To hit it, a navy needs real-time updates and a complex communication chain. Pakistan currently lacks this chain.

These weaknesses make Pakistan’s bold claim that it can threaten an Indian carrier in open waters far less credible.

The Narrative vs. the Reality

Pakistan’s official messaging and online supporters routinely claim that new missile systems like the P-282 SMASH give the navy a powerful “long-range anti-carrier” capability. The visuals are strong: fiery launches, tall plumes, and controlled explosions at sea. But these images hide a larger truth.

A navy must first be able to operate confidently at sea before claiming the ability to strike enemy ships far away. It must be able to track targets, coordinate with satellites, maintain flexible deployments, and sail in contested waters. Pakistan has not demonstrated these abilities.

Instead, it has shown the opposite. During moments of real tension, its fleet has struggled to sail out. Its ships have remained within protective coastal zones. It has relied on digital narratives, not sea control. The operational weakness contradicts the missile narrative at every level.

A Capability Begins With the Fleet, Not the Video

Pakistan may eventually build a more capable navy. It may fix its maintenance issues, expand its sensor network, and enhance its fleet’s readiness. But as of now, the story told on social media is far ahead of actual conditions at sea.

The truth is straightforward: a navy that cannot sail out in a crisis cannot credibly threaten a moving Indian carrier group far from shore.

Until Pakistan demonstrates real operational confidence—not just controlled missile launches, its claims of long-range naval strike power will remain more narrative than reality.

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About Author

Commodore Ranjit B Rai (Retd) is the author of the book 'The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. He is an RNSC-qualified officer who served as Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations and writes on maritime matters. He also served as the India Representative of Waterman Steam Ships USA and curated the New Delhi Maritime Museum.