OPINION | Tactical Airspace Control: Why the Army Must Own the Tactical Sky from Battalion to Corps

by Aritra Banerjee

Modern battlefields have erased the once-clear boundary between ground and air. Where airpower was once the preserve of fighters, helicopters, and strategic bombers, today it is crowded with drones, loitering munitions, rockets, artillery shells, and glide weapons, most of them originating from the land domain itself.

This shift makes one reality unavoidable: tactical airspace is inseparable from ground combat. The Army must assume ownership of this battlespace down to the company and battalion level. Without such control, operations risk being paralysed by fratricide, wasted fires, and lost tactical opportunities.

The Post-Sindoor Drone Revolution

The Sindoor clashes were a turning point, unleashing a flood of unmanned systems onto the tactical battlefield. Company and battalion commanders now field swarms of drones for surveillance, strike, and battle damage assessment. First-person-view (FPV) drones have emerged as the “artillery shell with eyes”, hunting tanks into cover or demolishing bunkers at negligible cost.

But proliferation has created congestion. Every artillery salvo, loitering munition, and rocket trajectory competes for the same crowded pocket of airspace as quadcopters, rotary UAVs, and surface-to-air interceptors. Unless the Army enforces airspace control at the lowest level, tactical manoeuvres will dissolve into chaos.

ROZs and Kill Boxes at Company Scale

Airspace control tools once reserved for higher formations, restricted operating zones (ROZs), and kill boxes must now be pushed down to battalion and company level. In an era when every rifle company can launch ten or more drones simultaneously, centralised deconfliction is too slow.

Company-level ROZs would ensure artillery shells and rockets fly through cleared corridors, while kill boxes would allow commanders to layer artillery, loitering munitions, and FPVs in designated strike areas without fear of fratricide. Only ground commanders, fighting in real time, have the awareness and authority to create and adjust these zones effectively.

FAC/JTAC Density Under Army Control

Forward Air Controllers (FACs) and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) were once seen primarily as links to Air Force close air support. That definition is now obsolete. Every rocket battery, artillery gun, and armed drone sortie constitutes “air support” from the land.

To be meaningful, FAC/JTAC density must be under Army tasking. A corps may coordinate missile fires with the Air Force, but at battalion or company scale, Army JTACs must have the authority to clear drone strikes, authorise FPV engagements, and deconflict artillery missions. Anything less leaves tactical commanders unable to control their own battlespace.

Preventing Blue-on-Blue Between GBAD and Drones

The most urgent risk is fratricide between ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems and friendly drones. Modern battlefields bristle with MANPADS, SHORADS, and medium-range SAMs, all programmed to hunt small aerial targets. Yet above the same battlefield buzz hundreds of friendly drones conducting reconnaissance or strike missions.

Preventing GBAD from shooting down friendly drones demands a digitally integrated identification and deconfliction system. Company commanders must feed drone flight plans into battalion or brigade airspace cells, while GBAD operators must be able to distinguish friend from foe in real time. Without such integration, blue-on-blue engagements are inevitable.

Airspace as Ground Combat

Airspace management can no longer remain the preserve of Air Force planners or higher headquarters. At the tactical edge, it is now as intrinsic to ground combat as fire planning or manoeuvre control.

The infantry company commander launching an FPV swarm requires immediate deconfliction with artillery tubes firing suppression. The battalion commander employing a loitering munition needs real-time assurance that his own GBAD will not engage it. Only the Army, operating from company through corps, possesses the situational awareness and command linkages to achieve this synchronisation. Tactical airspace control cannot be outsourced.

Building the Doctrine of the Tactical Sky

The wars of tomorrow will be fought not only across ridgelines and river valleys but also in the congested few hundred feet of airspace immediately above them. To prevail, the Army must move beyond ad hoc arrangements and build a doctrine that makes tactical airspace control an organic part of ground combat. That means institutionalising ROZs and kill boxes at battalion and company scale, placing FAC and JTAC networks firmly under Army tasking, and integrating GBAD with drone operations through real-time digital deconfliction.

Victory in future conflicts will not be determined solely by who commands the skies at 30,000 feet. It will hinge on who can dominate the tactical sky at 300 feet, and that responsibility lies squarely with the Army.

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About Author

Aritra Banerjee is a Defence, Foreign Affairs & Aerospace Journalist and Co-Author of the book The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. Having spent his formative years in the United States before returning to India, he brings a unique global perspective to his work. A graduate in Mass Media from the University of Mumbai, he holds a Master’s in International Relations, Security & Strategy from O.P. Jindal Global University, along with a CPD-accredited Professional Certificate in Strategic Communications from King’s College London (War Studies). He has contributed to national and international publications across TV, Print, and Digital platforms, reporting on major Defence, Security, and Aerospace events in India and Europe, and spending extended periods in Kashmir, engaging with communities and gaining firsthand perspectives that inform his work. Twitter: @Aritrabanned