OPINION | Whilst The Pakistan Navy Talks Modernisation, The Tihamah Strike Shows the Leaks in the Plans' Hull

by Ashu Mann

The Pakistan Navy has spent the past decade expanding its fleet with Chinese-built frigates, new submarines, and maritime surveillance assets. It is a modernization program that officials routinely describe in terms of blue-water ambitions and regional influence. The August 11, 2026, missile strike on the cargo vessel Tihamah in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which killed four crew members, three of them Pakistani nationals, according to Yemen's transport ministry, tested a different measure entirely: whether that modernization translates into protection for Pakistani citizens actually at risk in these waters.

The gap between these two measures is not new, but the Tihamah strike has sharpened it. Pakistan's naval public narrative, built around the acquisition of Type 054A/P frigates and Hangor-class submarines developed with Chinese assistance, along with participation in exercises such as AMAN and deployments under the Combined Maritime Forces, emphasizes platforms, exercise participation, and diplomatic partnerships. What it has not yet demonstrated, based on the pattern visible in the Tihamah incident and previous Red Sea attacks since 2023, is a capacity to prevent or respond to missile strikes on vessels crewed by Pakistani nationals.

Four days before the strike, Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif described as "a shield of peace." Pakistan also joined a newly formed 14-nation maritime coalition intended to secure the Bab al-Mandeb, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden. The coalition held its first institutional planning meeting on August 12 and 13, one day after the Tihamah was hit. Neither arrangement had operational assets in position to intercept the strike or accelerate the rescue of its crew.

The vessel's entire complement of 11 crew members was Pakistani or Indonesian. Four of them, including three Pakistanis, were killed, while the remaining seven were injured, according to Yemen's Coast Guard. A second missile struck the rescue operation itself, killing two Yemeni rescuers and bringing the total number of deaths from the incident to six.

The question this raises for Pakistan's defense establishment is one of priorities rather than capability alone. Prestige platforms, submarines, and frigates that project regional influence and feature prominently in Pakistan Navy's public communications serve a different function from the kind of persistent, low-profile presence needed to protect merchant crews transiting a specific high-risk corridor. A submarine fleet does not intercept a missile aimed at a cargo ship, and a frigate assigned to a distant multinational task force does not shorten the time it takes to reach a burning vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations has publicized the Navy's counter-narcotics successes, including a $972 million seizure under Combined Task Force 150 in October 2025, as evidence of the service's growing operational reach. That reach has not yet been demonstrated in the specific mission of protecting Pakistani seafarers from missile attacks. Such a mission would likely require different assets, positioned differently, from the platforms currently at the center of the Navy's modernization program.

Whether Pakistan's defense establishment adjusts its naval priorities in response to the Tihamah strike, shifting resources toward seafarer protection rather than focusing primarily on prestige acquisitions and coalition membership, will become clear only in how the country responds to the next attack in these waters. Given the pattern since late 2023, maritime security analysts consider another attack a matter of when rather than if.

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About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

Disclaimer: This article represents the author’s independent analysis and perspective based on publicly available information. It does not constitute official guidance, intelligence assessment, or policy recommendation, and does not reflect the positions of Access Hub or any affiliated entities.