OPINION | One Commissioned, Seven Pending: The Hangor Programme's Real Status at Year Eleven

by Ashu Mann

When PNS Hangor was commissioned on April 30, 2026, Pakistan's naval leadership described it as a historic moment and the beginning of a new era of deterrence in the Arabian Sea. That characterization was not without merit. However, eleven years after the contract was signed, only one of the eight promised submarines has entered service. Seven remain pending.

Of the four submarines being built in China, only PNS Hangor has been commissioned. Its sister vessels, PNS Shushuk, PNS Mangro, and PNS Ghazi, completed their launches during 2025 and remain in the final stages of sea trials. Given that all four boats had reached advanced sea trial phases by late 2025, PNS Shushuk, PNS Mangro, and PNS Ghazi are expected to follow in relatively quick succession, potentially within 2026. Full fleet induction is now projected between 2028 and 2030, representing a meaningful delay from the original projections, though still well short of the 2033-34 timelines that are sometimes cited and are not supported by current open-source analysis.

The Sea Trials Picture

Late-stage sea trials for modern submarines are far from a formality. They involve weapons system integration, acoustic testing across multiple environmental conditions, crew certification, and command authority qualification. The period between the completion of sea trials and the achievement of full operational capability, when a submarine can be deployed on combat missions and independently execute its assigned strategic role, is often where programs take longer than official schedules anticipate.

The commissioning of PNS Hangor is more than a fleet expansion. It marks the beginning of a structural shift in how the Pakistan Navy prioritizes its procurement spending.

These submarines will require continued funding to complete the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KSEW) boats, establish shore-based maintenance infrastructure for a larger fleet, and train crews for what will become a significantly expanded submarine force.

The KSEW Four

The outlook for the four domestically built submarines is less favorable. Steel was cut for the fifth boat in December 2021, while the keel for the sixth was not laid until February 2025. At the current rate of construction, the KSEW-built submarines are unlikely to enter service before the early 2030s.

In any country with effective defense oversight institutions, a naval program that has fallen behind its original schedule, altered its core propulsion technology midway through development, and appears unlikely to deliver its full complement before 2030 would trigger significant accountability measures. Parliamentary committees would summon program managers, audit agencies would examine cost overruns, and the public record would contain, at a minimum, a revised timeline and an explanation for the delays. None of this has occurred in the case of the Hangor program.

Each year of delay carries real operational consequences. India's anti-submarine warfare network continues to evolve. Its P-8I fleet is gathering acoustic intelligence on the Hangor class with every patrol cycle. As a result, the operational environment that the final KSEW-built submarines will enter is likely to be more challenging than the one that existed when the program was originally conceived.

The Accounting Pakistan Has Not Provided

What Pakistan has not done is formally acknowledge the schedule changes, explain the reasons behind them, or provide a revised timeline on the public record.

The program's acquisition cost represents only the initial financial commitment. Sustainment, training, infrastructure, and operational expenses will accumulate over decades. Yet these costs, like the acquisition price itself, have never been publicly itemized or disclosed to elected representatives.

One commissioned submarine after eleven years is a genuine milestone for the China-built portion of the contract. It is also only a partial delivery of a program that was presented as transformational. The gap between what was promised and what has been delivered, in terms of timing, domestic industrial output, and public accountability, is one that Pakistan's citizens are entitled to understand. That understanding requires a level of disclosure that, as of mid-2026, has not been provided.

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About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

Disclaimer: This article represents the author’s independent analysis and perspective based on publicly available information. It does not constitute official guidance, intelligence assessment, or policy recommendation, and does not reflect the positions of Access Hub or any affiliated entities.