OPINION | The Missing Middlemen: Why Pakistan Never Arrests the Brokers Who Control Its Maritime Drug Trade

by Cmde Ranjit Rai

Track Pakistan’s narcotics narratives long enough, and you begin to notice something strangely consistent. Every time the authorities announce a drug seizure, the reports highlight the same categories of arrests. A boat crew here. A low-level courier is there. A handful of fishermen were accused of carrying heroin or methamphetamine across the Arabian Sea. Yet, no matter how many years pass, the names that truly matter never appear. The intermediaries who arrange the shipments, recruit the crews, coordinate landing points, and negotiate with international buyers remain completely absent from official records.

These omissions aren’t coincidences, but rather a structural feature of how Pakistan manages its public narrative around maritime narcotics. The state portrays itself as either a victim of smugglers or an enforcer cracking down on crime.

But when investigators outside Pakistan trace the networks operating along its jagged coastline, they routinely find the same pattern: the middle layer of brokers, clearing agents, and coordinators is protected by a bubble of silence. This becomes even clearer when compared with reporting from India or Sri Lanka.

When Indian law enforcement intercepts narcotics, the arrest lists include not only couriers but also the facilitators who handled logistics, often identified through digital forensics and communication analysis. Sri Lanka follows a similar model. High-value arrests consistently include brokers who may never have touched the cargo but were instrumental in enabling the network.

Pakistan’s omissions stand out because the pattern repeats without exception.

To understand why, one must examine how the Makran coastal region operates.

The region is dotted with landing points, hidden coves, informal anchorages, and small fishing settlements that date back to the earliest civilizations in the area—places that operate outside formal regulation. These areas are ideal for traffickers because they allow boats to load shipments quickly and vanish into open waters without scrutiny.

But coordinating such movement requires individuals with influence, access, and networks both inland and offshore. These players typically maintain links with factions inside the state machinery, which helps explain why they never appear in arrest reports.

The Combined Maritime Forces have intercepted multiple dhows heading toward the Maldives, Seychelles, Kenya, and Tanzania. Many of these vessels had crew members who claimed they were hired on short notice by intermediaries they never met directly. The dhows often launched from areas under Pakistani jurisdiction.

Yet despite repeated interdictions, the same districts continue to show up as points of origin, without any corresponding arrests of those orchestrating the operations.

Another clue lies in how quickly Pakistan releases information after a seizure.

The immediate announcements usually focus on the quantity of drugs recovered and the nationality of the crew. There is rarely any mention of financial trails, communication intercepts, or deeper investigations into wider networks. This suggests that the state is more interested in presenting surface-level compliance than dismantling the infrastructure behind the trade.

There is also a political dimension. Acknowledging the brokers would expose how deeply entrenched narcotics trafficking is within local governance structures. It would reveal connections between traffickers, local officials, and elements within state agencies. Such exposure could trigger political consequences, especially in regions already dealing with instability. In contrast, India and Sri Lanka target the middle layer because it is the only way to disrupt the trade long-term.

Taking down low-level couriers changes nothing. Taking down brokers collapses the network. Pakistan appears unwilling to take this step, raising questions about whether these omissions are protective or deliberate.

Digital forensics from past investigations outside Pakistan provides further confirmation.

In several cases, chat histories, transaction records, and call logs recovered from couriers intercepted in foreign waters point directly to handlers in Pakistan who continue to operate without consequence. These handlers arrange payments, allocate boats, recruit crew, and schedule movements.

Yet Pakistan has never publicly acknowledged its identities.

Another revealing detail emerges when examining Pakistani media coverage. When the government wants to demonstrate action, it focuses on seizures, not prosecutions. It highlights the presence of drugs rather than the networks behind them, creating the appearance of vigilance without addressing the core problem.

Maritime trafficking requires coordination, not luck. Someone must manage fuel logistics, transshipment points, and rendezvous coordinates. Someone must maintain relationships between Iranian suppliers, Pakistani brokers, and buyers along the East African route.

These operations cannot be masterminded by fishermen acting independently. The absence of middlemen in Pakistan’s arrest lists, therefore, reveals the extent to which the state chooses not to identify those responsible.

The consequences extend far beyond Pakistan’s borders. India and Sri Lanka bear the burden of intercepting dhows that originate from Pakistani waters. The Maldives and Seychelles receive consignments intended for transshipment to other regions. East African nations face the domestic fallout of heroin and methamphetamine distribution. In every case, the networks trace back to the same coastal corridors in Pakistan.

Until Pakistan acknowledges the brokers and dismantles their influence, the maritime narcotics trade will continue. Arresting couriers and fishermen makes for easy headlines, but it does nothing to undermine the financial and logistical backbone of the trade. The missing middlemen are missing for a reason—and that reason is the clearest indicator of Pakistan’s selective enforcement.

---

About Author

Commodore Ranjit B Rai (Retd) is the author of the book 'The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. He is an RNSC-qualified officer who served as Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations and writes on maritime matters. He also served as the India Representative of Waterman Steam Ships USA and curated the New Delhi Maritime Museum.