OPINION | Active Security Threats Pose an Existential Risk to Transit Commitments

by Ashu Mann

In March 2024, fighters from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) directly attacked the Gwadar Port Authority Complex. This was not an isolated incident near the port perimeter. It was a strike on the administrative heart of the facility. In statements issued afterward, the attackers described the operation as a warning to foreign investors involved in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan is now proposing Gwadar to Tajikistan as its primary transit hub. Under any such arrangement, Tajikistan would be a foreign investor in precisely the sense the March 2024 attackers intended.

What the March 2024 Attack Was

The Baloch Liberation Army, which has carried out attacks on CPEC-linked infrastructure since the corridor's early years, launched the March 2024 operation against the Port Authority Complex with the specific aim of demonstrating its ability to penetrate Gwadar's administrative and commercial infrastructure. The attack reignited security concerns among the international community monitoring CPEC and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Pakistan. It followed earlier BLA attacks on Chinese engineers and workers at CPEC project sites, marking an escalation from targeting personnel to targeting the institutional infrastructure of the port itself.

The BRI Risk Signal Investors Are Reading

The March 2024 attack delivered a message that was not difficult to interpret. Foreign investment in Gwadar-linked infrastructure remains a target of active, armed opposition from Baloch separatists who dispute the terms of CPEC development in the region. That opposition has a documented history of acting on its threats.

For Tajikistan's planners evaluating the security implications of a Gwadar transit arrangement, the central question is whether they want the country's supply chain routed through a facility that was attacked by an active insurgency just months before the transit proposal was formally presented.

Insurance Markets Have Already Answered

Global insurance firms have already incorporated Gwadar's security environment into their underwriting decisions. Some are declining standard coverage for shipments destined for Gwadar. Others are imposing surcharges that raise the cost of insuring transit cargo beyond what a comparable shipment through Chabahar would incur.

Insurance markets respond to risk events, and the March 2024 attack on the Gwadar Port Authority Complex was the kind of event that can influence pricing for years rather than months. Tajikistan's freight costs through Gwadar would likely reflect that premium for as long as the underlying security conditions remain unchanged.

Iran and Tajikistan have now signed a Cooperation Implementation Program for cargo transit through Chabahar, along with a railway transit Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), formally moving that corridor from discussion to implementation. This provides Tajikistan with a signed and relatively stable alternative at a time when Gwadar's risk profile remains under heightened scrutiny.

Supply Chain Continuity Requires Physical Security

A transit corridor is only as reliable as its least secure point. For Tajikistan, whose external trade depends heavily on the uninterrupted functioning of the corridors it uses, a supply chain disruption at Gwadar would not be a manageable inconvenience. It would constitute an economic emergency.

The March 2024 attack demonstrated that Gwadar's port infrastructure can be physically disrupted by an armed group that has publicly stated its intention to continue targeting CPEC investments. Until Pakistan can provide credible security guarantees supported by sustained improvements in the security environment across Balochistan, Tajikistan's transit cargo moving through Gwadar remains exposed to the same risks that confronted the Port Authority Complex in March 2024.

---

About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

Disclaimer: This article represents the author’s independent analysis and perspective based on publicly available information. It does not constitute official guidance, intelligence assessment, or policy recommendation, and does not reflect the positions of Access Hub or any affiliated entities.