OPINION | From Buffer to Battleground: Nepal's Shifting Role in the India-China Geopolitical Contest

by Ashu Mann

Nepal’s value to its neighbors has historically rested on its neutrality. As a buffer state maintaining functional relations with both India and China, it has provided each with a degree of strategic comfort: both know their borders are not being militarized in coordination with the other. This comfort has long been a quiet but significant diplomatic asset for Kathmandu.

That buffer function is now eroding. China’s infrastructure investment in Nepal, pursued under the Belt and Road Initiative, which Kathmandu joined in 2017, includes road corridors, tunnel projects, and a proposed trans-Himalayan railway. If completed, this railway would connect Kathmandu directly to Tibet Autonomous Region’s existing rail network, dramatically reducing logistics time across a border that was, until recently, largely inaccessible. While the Chinese section is under construction, the Nepali segment remains in the feasibility stage.

The trajectory, however, is clear and New Delhi interprets it through a strategic lens. At the same time, China’s military engagement with Nepal has steadily expanded. Joint exercises under the Sagarmatha series resumed in 2024 after a COVID-era pause. Chinese delegations have proposed armored vehicle sales and officer training programs, and Nepal has procured military equipment from a Chinese state manufacturer over competing Indian bids.

Nepal has not entered into formal security agreements with China and has repeatedly affirmed that it will not join any military alliance. Nevertheless, India closely monitors the accumulation of these smaller engagements.

The erosion of Nepal’s buffer role is not uniform. Its remittance-driven economy, hydropower export ambitions, and reliance on Indian transit routes all reinforce the importance of maintaining strong ties with India. The Nepal Army continues to maintain deeper institutional links with India than with China, reflecting decades of shared training, equipment relationships, and the longstanding tradition of Nepali citizens serving in the Indian Army. Nepal’s constitution also enshrines non-alignment, a principle that still shapes how Kathmandu positions itself internationally.

What has changed is the cost of maintaining that balance. In 1955, when China and Nepal established diplomatic relations, India’s regional dominance meant that balancing required relatively little active effort. Today, maintaining equidistance demands navigating two well-resourced and increasingly competitive relationships, each expecting more than simple neutrality from Kathmandu.

At times, the asymmetry becomes stark. In August 2025, India and China agreed bilaterally to resume cross-border trade through the Lipulekh Pass without consulting Nepal, despite Kathmandu’s longstanding territorial claims over the area. Nepal responded by sending diplomatic notes to both capitals. The episode underscored a reality rarely stated outright in official rhetoric: when the two powers find mutual convenience, Nepal’s interests can become secondary.

The shift from buffer to contested space is driven by geography, China’s growing ability to project economic and strategic influence across the Himalayas, and the intensifying rivalry between India and China. Nepal’s foreign policy challenge is no longer simply how to balance between two neighbors. It is how to avoid becoming the ground on which they compete.

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About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

Disclaimer: This article represents the author’s independent analysis and perspective based on publicly available information. It does not constitute official guidance, intelligence assessment, or policy recommendation, and does not reflect the positions of Access Hub or any affiliated entities.