OPINION | Caught Between Two Fires: How Pakistan's Shadow War Could Ignite Its Own House

by Ashu Mann

The strategic costs of Islamabad's covert alignment with Washington may ultimately fall most heavily on Pakistan’s own population.

In the weeks since the Iran war began, Pakistan has felt the tremors of a conflict unfolding 1,500 kilometers away.

Ten people were killed outside the American Consulate on March 1 when security guards opened fire on protesters expressing anger over U.S. actions against Iran. Petrol prices surged past PKR 458 per liter within a single month. Karachi’s large Shia population, a significant share of the city’s 20 million residents, gathered in mosques to mourn Khamenei with a grief that also signals a warning.

The government has heard that warning. According to allegations circulating at the highest levels of regional intelligence, it has chosen to ignore it.

These allegations claim that Pakistan has quietly granted the United States access to its airspace for drone operations, that Pakistan Air Force F-16s have supported American carrier strike groups, and that Pakistani naval assets have shared Iranian vessel positions with U.S. targeting systems. If accurate, they depict a country engaged in a covert conflict with a neighbor while facing growing unrest at home.

The domestic consequences could be as serious as the strategic ones. Pakistan’s Shia community, estimated at 15 to 20 percent of the country’s 250 million people, maintains deep emotional and, in some cases, organizational ties to Iran. The Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistani Shia militant group with links to Tehran, has been identified by analysts as a potential instrument of Iranian retaliation within Pakistan. Its members, many of whom fought in Syria under the IRGC’s Quds Force, are intimately familiar with the terrain of Balochistan and Sindh, far more than any external Iranian force could be.

Beyond the security threat lies clear economic vulnerability. More than two million Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia and across the Gulf send billions of dollars home each year, forming a critical lifeline for Pakistan’s fragile economy. Iranian retaliation against Gulf states, already underway since the strikes began, directly threatens both these workers and their remittances. A Pakistan that is quietly supporting U.S. operations against Iran would struggle to advocate for the safety of its diaspora amid consequences it is helping to create.

China adds another layer of complexity. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative runs through Pakistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. At the same time, China has significant investments in Iran’s energy infrastructure and played a key role in brokering the Saudi-Iran rapprochement of 2023. If Pakistan’s military establishment is covertly assisting U.S. efforts that undermine China’s diplomatic achievements, while publicly maintaining neutrality, it risks straining a relationship central to its economic future.

The architects of this covert alignment, widely believed to be Pakistan’s military leadership in Rawalpindi rather than the civilian government, appear to view these risks as manageable. They may believe that plausible deniability is sufficient, that Iran cannot conclusively prove its suspicions, that China will avoid direct confrontation, and that domestic unrest can be controlled through curfews, clerical engagement, and public statements that provide political cover.

This calculation may prove correct. Pakistan’s military has made similarly bold strategic bets before and endured. The Afghan jihad, the post-9/11 realignment, and years of balancing relationships between the Taliban and the United States all demonstrate a history of navigating complex and contradictory alliances.

However, those earlier strategies unfolded in a less volatile environment. The 2026 Iran war involves a regional power fighting for survival, with both the intent and capability to project force inside Pakistan. The stakes for ordinary Pakistani civilians, who play no role in these strategic decisions, have rarely been higher.

In Karachi, the protesters outside the American Consulate on March 1 did not realize they might be protesting a conflict their own military was quietly helping sustain. They simply believed that an injustice had been committed against a country they felt connected to, and they wanted their government to acknowledge it.

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About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

Disclaimer: This article represents the author’s independent analysis and perspective based on publicly available information. It does not constitute official guidance, intelligence assessment, or policy recommendation, and does not reflect the positions of Access Hub or any affiliated entities.