OPINION | De Facto Independence: The Tibetan State That Existed Before the PLA

by Ashu Mann

From the Dalai Lama’s 1913 proclamation to the defeat of Qing forces, Tibet functioned as an independent state for nearly four decades. This historical reality challenges the Chinese Communist Party’s claim that Tibet was “always part of China.”

For decades, Beijing has promoted a single, blunt narrative: Tibet has always been an inseparable part of China. Repeated in official white papers, textbooks, and diplomatic messaging, this claim operates less as historical analysis and more as political doctrine.

A careful review of the period between 1913 and 1950, grounded in archival records, treaties, and administrative practice, presents a different picture. Tibet was not merely autonomous; it functioned as a sovereign polity under the Dalai Lama, free from Chinese control.

The turning point came on February 13, 1913, when the 13th Dalai Lama formally proclaimed Tibet’s independence following the collapse of the Qing dynasty. This was not a symbolic or purely spiritual declaration. Qing troops had been defeated and expelled from Tibetan territory, ending centuries of intermittent imperial influence.

With the Qing Empire dissolved and the Republic of China struggling to consolidate authority, Tibet emerged as a de facto independent state, exercising full control over its internal and external affairs.

This period, often minimized or distorted in Chinese historiography, lasted 38 years, until the People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet in 1950.

During these decades, Tibet minted its own currency, maintained a standing army, operated an independent administrative system, and conducted foreign relations with British India, Nepal, and Mongolia. No Chinese government exercised sovereignty over Tibet during this time, nor did Tibet acknowledge Chinese overlordship.

Archival treaties further weaken the claim that Tibet was “always part of China.” Early 20th-century agreements involving Tibet treated it as a distinct political entity rather than a provincial extension of China. Even when Chinese representatives participated in negotiations, such as during the Simla Convention, China’s refusal to ratify the agreement did not erase Tibet’s separate status. Instead, it reflected Beijing’s limited ability to assert authority over Lhasa.

The political role of the Dalai Lama during this era was equally significant. He was not simply a religious leader but the effective head of state, governing a sovereign realm. His administration collected taxes, enforced laws, appointed officials, and defended territorial integrity. The fusion of spiritual and temporal authority was consistent with forms of pre-modern statehood across Asia and Europe.

The CCP’s contemporary claims rely on a selective interpretation of imperial history, equating Qing-era influence with permanent sovereignty. Yet empires often exercised loose control over peripheral regions without integrating them as modern nation-states. By that reasoning, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Korea could also be described as “always part of China,” a claim Beijing itself does not maintain. The inconsistency is evident.

What makes the 1913 to 1950 period particularly consequential is its clarity. This was not a vague zone of contested suzerainty but a documented era of self-rule, underscored by China’s absence.

The so-called “peaceful liberation” of 1951, therefore, was not reunification but the forcible incorporation of a functioning and self-governing entity.

Reexamining this history is not merely academic. It carries contemporary political weight. The erasure of Tibet’s sovereign past informs policies of cultural assimilation, demographic restructuring, and religious restriction.

Restoring this historical record strengthens the moral and legal foundations of the Tibetan cause.

The legacy of Tibet’s 38 years of autonomy challenges one of the CCP’s most persistent narratives. It affirms that Tibet’s call for self-determination is not separatism but restoration, a return to a sovereignty that once existed, governed by the Dalai Lama and documented in history.

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About the Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.