OPINION | Cheap hulls, costly strings: Inside China’s after-sales trap at sea

by Commodore Ranjit Rai (Retd)

Across a widening market, China is selling naval platforms at prices that feel thrifty, although delivery schedules are regularly delayed. That is no longer the primary issue, though. What happens next matters more. 

Beijing keeps technical know-how under lock and key (even for partner nations). Control of maintenance windows and the flow of spares stays in China’s hands, too.

As such, the customer nation’s Chinese-origin naval assets are always funnelled back to Chinese yards for maintenance, repairs, and upgrades.

That is the Dragon’s ingenious “after-sales trap”.

How The Trap Works

The mechanism is devious, even if unglamorous. The platform itself— whether a frigate or a submarine— is offered at a much lower price than other suppliers like France, United States, or Russia. But unlike most export deals from those nations, the element of technology transfer is often missing from Chinese contracts. 

Little is transferred in the way of software access, deep diagnostics, or fabrication rights. The training, which is a part of the package, teaches operation, but not maintenance or repair. When something breaks, the phone call goes to China, as does the payment. In peacetime this looks like regular commerce. In a crunch it starts to resemble leverage.

Independent researchers have flagged a pattern of “little accountability for maintenance and repair,” which leaves operators waiting for visiting technicians and late parts. Users also report that export variants are dialled down in sensors, propulsion and weapons. The price is low up front, then fidgety costs accumulate. It is penny-wise, fleet-poor.

What do the cases tell us?

Bangladesh bought two refurbished Ming-class submarines. On paper they were a leap. In water they have been mostly classroom boats, constantly in need of maintenance and constrained by dated sensors. Dhaka then poured more than a billion dollars into a new base to keep them afloat and available. Myanmar received a similar Ming; again, mainly for training, and with low endurance and reach.

Pakistan’s newer purchases look sharper but come with their own knots

Four Type 054A/P frigates arrived with celebration, yet integration with Western systems is limited, fencing off easy upgrades and mixed-fleet work. The eight-strong Hangor submarine project has already swapped originally intended German MTU engines for China’s CHD-620 units, the same substitution that triggered multi-year delays for Thailand’s S26T. 

The larger story running through these deals is dependency: after-sales support that slips, spares that dawdle, choices that keep the yard in control. 

Pakistan’s older F-22P frigates illustrate the reliability fog at the tactical level. Crews have spoken of temperamental radars, glitchy infrared sensors and combat systems that refuse to talk to each other, which is the naval equivalent of trying to listen with earplugs in. Sri Lanka’s Chinese-built P625, a gift no less, has faced frequent breakdowns and tired engines. These are not trophy stories. They are working-day headaches.

Cheaper Is Costlier

The ledger sours over time. A “bargain” hull that cannot be locally overhauled turns into a stop-start programme with long pier-side spells. When key spares are gated, commanders plan patrols around freight schedules. Crews lose currency. Morale thins. Bangladesh’s billion-dollar base for two elderly boats is an emblem of this quiet inflation. You save on day one, then pay every other day.

The market has noticed. Between 2016 and 2020, the volume of Chinese major arms exports fell by 7.8%, with share slipping from 5.6% to 5.2%, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks these flows. Word travels in ports and ready-rooms, as do cautionary tales.

Why is this dangerous?

Many of the customers sit in China’s strategic shadow. They have clashed with Beijing at sea or along borders, or felt the pinch of diplomatic pressure when interests diverged. If a crisis breaks out and a navy is wedded to Chinese after-sales timelines, Beijing can simply slow the metronome. Delay a shipment. Stall a software patch. Reprioritise the travelling team. It is leverage that looks like logistics.

In a real emergency, a single withheld component can keep a frigate alongside for a fortnight. A submarine waiting on an engine controller does not patrol. Readiness whittles away, quietly, while the other side chooses the tempo. That is the trap in one line.

About Author

Commodore Ranjit B Rai (Retd) is the author of the book ‘The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. He is an RNSC-qualified officer who served as Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations and writes on maritime matters. He also served as India Representative of Waterman Steam Ships USA and curated a New Delhi Maritime Museum.