OPINION | The New Battlespace: Why the Indian Army Must Command the Air Littoral
- Shashwat Gupta Ray

- Oct 21
- 4 min read
by Shashwat Gupta Ray

The skies immediately above ground troops, the 0–3,000m tactical layer now known as the air littoral, are fast becoming the most contested combat zone. To safeguard operational sovereignty, India’s Army must gain control over this space, supported by procurement reform, technology infusion, and doctrinal clarity.
In this layer, drones, loitering munitions, attack helicopters, and precision-guided systems operate directly above infantry and armored formations. Control of this layer decides who dominates the battlefield.
For the Indian Army, this space is no longer a passive zone of observation but an active battlespace. From the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the desert sectors of Rajasthan, drones and counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) now define tactical advantage.
The Ukraine war and even localized counter-terror operations under Op Sindoor have underscored that whoever commands the air littoral can dictate tempo, mobility, and survivability of ground forces.
The CDS-Led Integration Framework: Progress and Gaps
The Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) has pushed for an integrated air defense architecture through the Akashteer (Army) and IACCS (Air Force) networks. The goal is to fuse radar feeds, air threat data, and weapon systems into a seamless grid.
Yet, structural gaps remain. The Air Force traditionally controls all airspace operations—from high-altitude fighter missions to tactical drone flights—leaving the Army dependent on air tasking orders even for short-range engagements. This command model, designed for a pre-drone era, risks paralysis in fast-moving battles.
The Army’s growing advocacy is clear: ground commanders must have direct authority over drone assets and C-UAS systems operating in the air littoral. Quick, decentralized decisions are vital when enemy quadcopters appear within seconds or when loitering munitions circle over armored convoys. Without immediate control, reaction time extends, and casualties rise.
Lessons from Ukraine and Beyond
Ukraine’s battlefield experience offers a stark warning. Both Russian and Ukrainian units learned that control of the lower airspace is fleeting—and decisive. Small drones detect, guide artillery, and deliver munitions, while electronic warfare units jam or hijack them in real time. A single gap in coordination between air and land echelons leads to devastating losses.

For India, these lessons resonate deeply. The Army’s Op Sindoor in the high-altitude sector reportedly tested drone swarms, surveillance quadcopters, and indigenous loitering munitions.
These trials confirmed that air littoral dominance cannot be achieved by technology alone. It requires authority and integrated command structures responsive to the realities of ground combat.
Procurement Bottlenecks and the Sovereignty Dilemma
However, structural inefficiencies in procurement remain the biggest barrier to this transformation. Delays in the Make in India pipeline, limited Transfer of Technology (ToT) in joint ventures, and an imbalance between Defense PSUs and private innovators continue to slow modernization.

Projects for counter-drone systems and electronic warfare sensors often languish between committees and budgetary approvals. The result is a patchwork of unintegrated systems, each operating in isolation. This undermines the Army’s vision for a unified air defense picture under the Akashteer framework.
Moreover, over-centralization in defense procurement limits agility. Private firms pioneering AI-based drone detection or directed-energy weapons often face bureaucratic barriers, while PSUs retain priority despite slower turnaround times.
True operational sovereignty in the air littoral will come only when the procurement ecosystem allows faster induction, modular upgrades, and field-driven testing, not when innovation remains trapped in paperwork.
Why the Army Must Command Its Skies
For Infantry and Armored formations, air littoral control is as vital as artillery cover. Tanks and mechanized columns moving without drone overwatch are blind; infantry advancing without C-UAS protection are exposed.
Therefore, command of this airspace must rest with the Army’s ground commanders, coordinated but not subordinated to the Air Force’s broader strategic air picture. The CDS-led framework offers a foundation, but doctrine must evolve to grant the Army autonomy within the 0–3,000m layer.
This does not mean duplication of assets but a clear division of responsibility: The IAF ensures control of high-altitude airspace for strategic missions. The Army dominates the air littoral through its drone corps, short-range air defense (SHORAD) units, and electronic warfare elements.
Towards an Integrated, Agile Future
India’s evolving threat matrix—from swarming drones on the LAC to high-intensity mechanized warfare scenarios—demands that the Army secure the skies it fights under. To achieve this, three reforms are critical:
Procurement Acceleration: Time-bound approvals for C-UAS, AI-enabled detection, and loitering systems.
Command Autonomy: Empower ground formations to employ drone and anti-drone assets without centralized clearance.
Technology Partnerships: Incentivize private–public collaboration under Defense Acquisition Procedure (DAP) reforms.
The air littoral zone is the new frontier of battle. In this space, seconds decide survival. For India’s Army, owning the skies just above its soldiers is not just an operational need—it is the foundation of tactical sovereignty.
About Author

Shashwat Gupta Ray is a multiple award-winning defense and strategic affairs journalist with over 20 years of experience in print and digital media. Previously Deputy Editor at Herald Group of Publications and Resident Editor at Gomantak Times, he has extensively covered major events, including the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and Maoist insurgencies. He is also the creator of the award-winning YouTube channel Uncovering India, which focuses on impactful social and developmental documentaries.



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