OPINION | Seventeen Years After 26/11: India’s Military Space Gaps, and Why We Must Treat Space as Our First Line of Defense

by Omkar NIKAM

I often think back to November 26, 2008, not only because of personal grief, but also because it marked the moment I realized how national security failures rarely stem from one system collapsing. They emerge from blind spots, areas we fail to monitor, domains we assume are irrelevant, and tools we believe we can do without until reality proves otherwise.

Seventeen years later, I believe India has undeniably advanced its military space capabilities. But I also believe we are still underestimating the velocity at which regional threats are evolving, and overestimating the maturity of our space architecture.

If space is the high ground, then India is still fighting from halfway up the hill.

India’s Strategic Blind Spots in 2025: The Gaps We Cannot Ignore

India’s satellites are competent. Our launch capability is world-class. But isolated successes don’t strengthen national security; it is strengthened by systems that talk, coordinate, reinforce, and outpace adversaries.

Today, India’s biggest challenge is not a lack of assets, it is lack of architectural coherence.

As someone who has worked in the space-defense ecosystem, my view is that India is not strategically late, but we are strategically underbuilt.

1. Persistent Multi-Orbit ISR: India Still Sees in Snapshots, Not Streams

This is one of India’s most critical weaknesses. Our ISR today is episodic, not continuous. In modern conflict, adversaries exploit exactly these windows.

India’s ISR structure is still built for yesterday’s battles, slow-moving, predictable, and territorially constrained. But our adversaries operate with precision, deception, and speed.

India must shift from intelligence-on-demand to intelligence-always-on. Without this shift, any border or maritime escalation will advantage the quicker actor, and in today’s Indo-Pacific, that rarely favors India.

2. India Operates Satellites, but Not Yet a Space Warfighting Doctrine

This may be the most under-discussed problem. India has world-class space engineers, but satellite operators, those who fuse, exploit, and convert space data into warfighting advantage, are still emerging.

From my standpoint, India needs to acknowledge an uncomfortable truth:

We treat space as support; adversaries treat it as strategy.

Space intelligence should not merely flow to the armed forces; it should orchestrate operations.

India urgently needs a Tri-Service Space Command with independent authority, not advisory influence.

Without doctrinal unity, our space assets remain tools, not advantages.

3. India’s “Few Big Satellites” Model Is a Strategic Liability

Most of India’s major military satellites are:

• large,

• expensive,

• slow to replace,

• and exposed to ASAT threats.

China’s co-orbital technologies have changed the risk calculus. In my view, each large satellite is now a “strategic single point of failure.”

Architecture Comparison

Architecture	Pros	Cons	My Assessment
Large satellites	Strong capability	High vulnerability	Unsustainable for contested environments
Distributed constellations	Scalable & resilient	Higher orchestration demands	India must pivot here immediately

If India does not adopt a distributed architecture in the next five years, we risk strategic paralysis during a high-intensity conflict.

4. Maritime Domain Awareness: India Still Sees the Ocean Like a Coastline, Not a Theater

India’s maritime geography is an opportunity; our space posture treats it like a burden.

China has made the Indian Ocean a strategic pressure point. Research vessels, spy ships, underwater mapping platforms, these are not benign missions; they are pre-conflict shaping operations.

IOR Threat Metrics (2024–2025 Estimates)

Metric	Estimate	My Interpretation
Chinese vessel-days	+35% YoY	Intent is endurance, not presence
Dark ships	2,500+	A systemic challenge, not episodic
PLA research vessels	8–12 per quarter	Mapping for future naval advantage

India’s maritime surveillance must evolve from reaction to anticipation. We need a purpose-built maritime constellation, not an adapted civil one.

5. NavIC: The Right System With the Wrong Adoption Curve

I hold a strong opinion on this: NavIC should be non-negotiable across all defense platforms.

Its current underutilization is not a technical gap, it is a policy inertia gap.

Without NAVIC as a core guidance and timing source:

• UAV autonomy remains limited

• Precision fires rely on foreign systems

• Navy vessels are exposed to GPS spoofing

• Air missions lack sovereign redundancy

India’s missile and UAV ecosystem will not reach full maturity without full NavIC military adoption.

6. Space Domain Awareness: India Needs to See Space as a Contest, Not a Canvas

We track space. Others fight in space.

China’s proximity operations, dual-use rendezvous maneuvers, and electronic interference attempts are not theoretical; they are ongoing signals of strategic intent.

India must build a national SDA network with the same urgency that China applied to its Beidou infrastructure.

Opportunity Hotspots: Where India Needs to Invest Intelligently, Not Incrementally

Hotspot 1: Persistent ISR for LAC + IOR

• Border surveillance constellations

• SAR clusters for all-weather monitoring

• ELINT + RF mapping of maritime activity

• Pattern-of-life analytics

Hotspot 2: Tactical SatCom for Forward Units

• Battalion-level SatCom

• High-altitude links for Siachen and Daulat Beg Oldi

• Drone–satellite coordination loops

• Anti-jam terminals

Hotspot 3: Maritime Intelligence Layer Purpose-Built for the Indian Ocean

• Satellite AIS fusion

• RF detection

• Automated anomaly alerts

• Optical + SAR cross-verification

Hotspot 4: National Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Network

• Early warning against co-orbital intrusions

• Shielding satellites from jamming

• Predictive orbit modeling

• A unified SDA command

Hotspot 5: NAVIC Standardization Across All Defense Platforms

• Air Force guidance

• Naval fleet navigation

• Army precision fires

• Autonomous systems

• Strategic missile force alignment

Conclusion: India’s Security Will Be Decided in Orbits, Not Borders

India has made enormous progress, but progress without strategic acceleration still leaves us behind adversaries who treat space as a warfighting domain, not an engineering achievement.

My opinion is simple:

India must stop seeing space as an extension of security and start seeing it as its foundation.

Every major conflict in the Indo-Pacific will be shaped by:

• surveillance speed,

• communication resilience,

• navigational autonomy, and

• orbital awareness.

Space is not the final frontier. For India, it is the first line of defense.

And the decisions we make in this decade will determine whether India enters the next era as a space security leader or as a regional power forced into a reactive posture.

---

Today’s defense and space markets reward those who act on intelligence, not just collect it. That’s where Access Hub steps in.

We go beyond headlines to decode market movements, connect innovators with decision-makers, and help organizations convert strategic insight into real business traction across Space, Defense, Aerospace, Maritime, Media-Tech, and Energy Markets.

If your team is navigating these fast-moving domains, Access Hub is your partner for clarity, connection, and competitive edge. Contact us at: www.accesshub.world

---

About Author

Omkar NIKAM, Founder & CEO, Access Hub

Omkar is a consultant, analyst, and entrepreneur with over a decade of experience advising governments, space firms, defense agencies, aerospace, maritime, and media technology companies worldwide. At Access Hub, he shapes the vision, strategy, and global partnerships, positioning the platform at the crossroads of innovation and business growth.