OPINION | Deterrence or Arrogance? How Nuclear Tests Shaped Beijing’s Mindset

by Ashu Mann

China’s nuclear capability emboldened Beijing to leverage force in border disputes and pressure its neighbors, turning deterrence into a tool of coercion rather than restraint.

When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) detonated its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964, it declared to the world that it had entered the exclusive club of nuclear powers.

This achievement, publicly celebrated by Beijing as a defensive shield against Western “nuclear blackmail,” was also the beginning of a new phase in Chinese strategy, where nuclear capability was woven into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pursuit of territorial revisionism.

Between 1964 and 1967, China tested not only fission bombs but also thermonuclear weapons, rapidly advancing from a fledgling program to a credible nuclear force.

The pace of progress was remarkable: within 32 months of its first atomic test, Beijing conducted a successful hydrogen bomb detonation.

Unlike the gradual, doctrine-led development in democratic states, the PRC’s drive was motivated by Mao Zedong’s ideological push to prove Chinese strength, regardless of human or environmental costs. Nuclear capability, in Beijing’s hands, was less about deterrence by denial and more about coercion through fear.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet Clash: Nuclear Shadow Over the Amur

The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 revealed how nuclear weapons had already begun shaping Beijing’s strategic mindset.

As clashes erupted along the Ussuri River, Soviet leaders reportedly weighed pre-emptive strikes on Chinese nuclear facilities.

Beijing, however, framed its survival in nuclear terms: the mere existence of its growing arsenal deterred Moscow from escalation.

For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), this episode reinforced the lesson that nuclear weapons could shield conventional adventurism.

By creating a nuclear backdrop to its actions, Beijing gained political room to press territorial claims aggressively.

Unlike the Indian Army, which maintains a doctrine-led force rooted in stability and restraint, the PLA, under the Party’s command, saw nukes as political cover for coercive maneuvers.

Expansionism in the South China Sea and the Himalayas

Nuclear confidence reshaped Beijing’s regional behavior through the 1970s and 1980s. In the South China Sea, the PRC escalated its claims over the Paracels and Spratlys, gradually militarising reefs and atolls.

By the 1990s, with its nuclear deterrent considered survivable, Beijing’s coercive posture expanded: naval standoffs with Vietnam and the Philippines were conducted with the implicit shield of nuclear power.

Similarly, along the Himalayan frontier, nuclear capability emboldened Beijing in its border disputes with India. The 1962 war occurred before China’s nuclear breakout, but post-1964 confidence reinforced its intransigence in negotiations and willingness to adopt salami-slicing tactics.

The message to neighbors was clear: Beijing’s nuclear arsenal underpinned its readiness to apply conventional pressure while assuming adversaries would hesitate to escalate.

Army Perspective: Deterrence by Denial vs Coercion

For professional militaries like the Indian Army, nuclear weapons are integrated into a framework of deterrence by denial, designed to prevent conflict through credible defense and responsible doctrine. By contrast, the PLA, functioning as the CCP’s instrument of coercion, employs nuclear capability as a political umbrella for risk-taking.

This distinction is critical. In democratic systems, nuclear strategy is nested within civilian oversight, transparency, and adherence to no-first-use credibility.

In the PRC, however, “no first use” is declared but not trusted, as China’s rapid modernization of nuclear forces contradicts its own rhetoric. Deterrence here serves not only to deny aggression but to create space for coercion.

The PLARF’s Modern Expansion: Arrogance in the 21st Century

The transformation of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) in the last two decades underscores the shift from deterrence to nuclear arrogance.

Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments show Beijing expanding missile silos in Xinjiang and Gansu, signaling a move toward nuclear war-fighting capacity rather than minimal deterrence.

Hypersonic glide vehicle tests, MIRV-capable ICBMs, and theatre-range missiles blur the line between nuclear and conventional roles.

For the CCP, this arsenal is not merely about survival; it is about projecting dominance. Beijing wields its nuclear shield while pressing territorial claims in the South China Sea, escalating patrols around Taiwan, and sustaining aggressive postures in the Himalayas.

The nuclear umbrella emboldens the PLA’s “three warfares” approach, legal, psychological, and media warfare, designed to intimidate without firing a shot.

Deterrence as a Tool of Coercion

China’s nuclear program was born from insecurity but matured into a pillar of expansionism. The rapid 1964–67 progression, the lessons from the 1969 Sino-Soviet clash, and subsequent assertiveness in the South China Sea and Himalayas reveal a consistent pattern: Beijing uses nuclear weapons not merely to deter but to coerce.

Today, as the PLARF expands and the CCP fuses military power with nationalist ambition, the region faces a nuclear-armed actor that views restraint as weakness. The Indian Army’s doctrine of stability and professionalism stands in stark contrast to the PLA’s Party-driven coercion.

Ultimately, the question is not whether China’s arsenal deters war -- it does. The real issue is whether nuclear arrogance has become the foundation of Beijing’s expansionist mindset. And the evidence suggests it has.

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About Author

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.