OPINION | 26/11 to Today: Pakistan’s Terror Network Continues to Enjoy State Patronage

by Huma Siddiqui

Image credits: Wikipedia

When countries talk about terrorism, they usually speak in terms of isolated strikes, specific groups, or one-off incidents. But if you look at the last two decades in South Asia, a very different picture emerges. It becomes clear that the threat is not episodic. It is structural, growing from the same geography, relying on the same actors, and surviving because the system that shelters it has never been dismantled. And once you map it out, the continuity becomes impossible to ignore.

Take November 26, 2008, for example. The world watched ten Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives hold India’s commercial capital hostage for nearly sixty hours. But what the world also learned later was that Mumbai was not simply an attack on India, it was a window into how Pakistan-based militant organizations operate with regional ambitions, cross-border networks, and external support systems that stretch beyond one country or one conflict. Mumbai forced the world to look at Lashkar’s recruitment, training, and fundraising abroad, including in Europe and North America. It showed that the group’s infrastructure was not local; it was transnational.

Moving forward, consider what happened in the Kashmir Valley after 2008. The names of the groups involved changed, from Lashkar to Jaish-e-Mohammed and their splinter factions, but the operational footprint did not. Whether it was the attacks in Uri, Pathankot, Pulwama, or the more recent strike in Pahalgam, the patterns remained the same. The attackers entered through well-documented infiltration corridors. Communication devices recovered from the militants connected to handlers across the border. The weapons, explosives, and literature they carried matched supply chains traced back to Pakistan for years. India changed governments, strategies, and counter-terror formations, yet the origins of these attacks remained fixed.

But here is where we must widen the lens. This is not just an India-Pakistan issue. These groups have operated in Afghanistan for years. UN monitoring reports, published annually, have pointed to Lashkar fighters embedded with Taliban units during their years of insurgency as Mujahids.

Several assessments by NATO commanders before 2021 noted the presence of Pakistan-based militants in eastern Afghanistan, especially in Kunar, Nuristan, and Paktika. These were not casual fighters crossing over. They were organized cadres with training histories that eerily mirrored those of groups active in Kashmir.

The United States, in its Country Reports on Terrorism, has repeatedly described Pakistan as a safe haven for the leadership of groups that operate in both India and Afghanistan. Even after the fall of Kabul in 2021, intelligence reports from multiple countries have continued to track the presence of Lashkar-linked individuals in Afghan territory. When you line up these reports, one after the other, you see a corridor of influence running from Pakistan’s Punjab province to Kashmir and outward to Afghanistan’s eastern and southern regions, in areas of opium and poppy cultivation. It is not a hidden corridor. It is a documented one, with reports submitted to the UN Security Council.

People often assume that these movements have no external implications. But consider what this means for South Asia as a region. India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed neighbors with a history of high-intensity conflict.

Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of Central and South Asia. When Pakistan-based groups operate across these regions, the instability they create does not stop at the border. It affects trade corridors, humanitarian routes, energy projects, and regional connectivity. Investors look at these patterns and hesitate.

Global commercial, transport, and supply chains running through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as the corresponding airspace, respond to risk levels. Terrorism here is not just a local security concern; it is a global economic and strategic concern as well.

Even beyond South Asia, examples make this point clearer. Sri Lanka has recorded the presence of Pakistan-linked radical channels during its counter-terror investigations over the last fifteen years. Several African states have reported individuals transiting with forged documentation produced by networks based in Pakistan.

Southeast Asian intelligence agencies have intercepted travel routes linking extremist recruits back to Pakistan’s training ecosystems. These are not isolated reports. They appear in declassified briefings, court filings, and UN panel summaries. They show that the infrastructure that supports cross-border terror is not limited to India. It is a network with global implications.

The relevant question then becomes: why does this infrastructure endure? The answer lies in how Pakistan’s establishment has embedded militant groups into its strategic thinking for decades. Organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are not rogue outgrowths. They have enjoyed protection from individuals within Pakistan’s intelligence setup.

Their offices operate in civilian neighborhoods. Their leaders hold public rallies calling for terrorism against Indian “infidels.” Their charities openly collect funds for the same. In many cases, these activities resume shortly after brief periods of pressure-induced bans. The system does not collapse because it is not meant to collapse. It is designed to remain partially visible, partially deniable, and fully usable as needed.

International institutions have repeatedly acknowledged this. The United Nations lists Lashkar and Jaish as entities linked to attacks in India and Afghanistan. The FATF has documented the financial architecture supporting these groups. The United States Treasury has issued multiple advisories detailing the networks it maintains across South Asia and the Middle East. Even when Pakistan introduces temporary measures to avoid international sanctions, the underlying structure remains untouched. Leadership changes occur, but the groups do not lose operational freedom, considering Pakistan is a proxy democracy run by the same cadres who run the terrorists.

India’s response has therefore evolved. After 26/11, India strengthened surveillance and coastal defense. When attacks in Kashmir intensified, India increased cross-border counter-infiltration. Following Pulwama, India demonstrated it was willing to respond beyond the Line of Control.

Operation Sindoor went even further by treating Pakistan-backed terror not as an intermittent challenge but as a sustained security environment requiring active suppression. The logic behind these shifts is straightforward: when the threat is structural, the response must also be structural.

The anniversary of 26/11 must serve as a reminder of why this recalibration was necessary. It reminds the world that the groups that struck Mumbai, New York, Dar es Salaam, and countless more did not disappear. They remained active in Kashmir. They operated in Afghanistan. They attempted to expand their networks abroad. The threat did not stop at India’s borders, and neither did the consequences.

While Pakistan continues to insist it is a victim of circumstances beyond its control, findings recorded in UN reports, U.S. court cases, NATO assessments, FATF reviews, and regional intelligence summaries contradict that narrative from every direction. State-backed terror is not a slogan. It is a pattern that can be traced through data, evidence, and history.

While India must carry the memory of Mumbai, the lessons extend far beyond it. From Kashmir to Kabul, and across the broader South Asian security landscape, Pakistan-backed terror remains a destabilizing force. Until the infrastructure behind it is dismantled, the region will continue to face a threat that crosses borders, adapts to pressure, and survives on the protection it receives.

---

About Author

Huma Siddiqui is a senior journalist with more than three decades of experience covering Defense, Space, and the Ministry of External Affairs. She began her career with The Financial Express in 1993 and moved to FinancialExpress.com in 2018. Her reporting often integrates defence and foreign policy with economic diplomacy, with a particular focus on Afro-Asia and Latin America.